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Non-technical Summary 
Religion is increasingly acknowledged to be a cultural dimension which affects economic 
outcomes in different regards. This contribution focuses on religion’s possible impact on the 
size of the shadow economy. Different dimensions of the religious markets are taken into ac-
count. These dimensions refer to the overall degree of religiosity, the specific impact of dif-
ferent religions, religious competition or the proximity between religion and the state. For 
example, we would expect that the shadow economy is smaller in religious countries and in 
countries with a close link between religion and the state. The former is to be expected be-
cause the ethical teaching of religions imposes additional non-pecuniary costs on believers 
performing unlawful informal transactions. And the latter should hold because religion as an 
ally of the secular state should have self-interest to defend the secular partner’s financial ba-
sis. 
The empirical test makes use of the largest available country cross-section on the size of the 
shadow economy and matches this dataset with numerous religious indicators. The starting 
point is a baseline specification with standard economic determinants of shadow activities 
which then is augmented by religious indicators. We complement the analysis by a battery of 
robustness checks. 
Overall, our findings support the view that religion influences the level of informal transac-
tions, albeit with several qualifications. The analysis did not support the view that countries 
with religious citizens have smaller shadow economies per se. However, there is a significant 
divergence across main religions: Countries dominated by Islam or Eastern religions are asso-
ciated with smaller shadow economies compared to Christian countries for comparable levels 
of economic development and government effectiveness. Furthermore, the proximity between 
state and religion is relevant whereas the degree of religious competition has no measurable 
impact. Close ties between the dominant religion and the state are typical for countries with a 
lower share of economic activity in the informal sector. Obviously, religion uses its normative 
influence on believers as a “supernatural police” to protect state interests if state and religion 
are in a reciprocal relationship. The relatively low shares of the shadow economy for Islamic 
countries is remarkable, given that Islamic ethics appear to be relatively skeptical on several 
forms of modern taxation. Obviously, the particularly close ties between religion and state in 
Islamic countries compensate for this. All these significant findings only hold for countries 
with low or middle income so that the existence of a state religion in industrial countries does 
not appear to be of empirical relevance in the context of the shadow economy. 
 
 
  
  
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Religion ist eine kulturelle Dimension, deren Bedeutung für internationale Unterschiede in 
der ökonomischen Performance zunehmend Beachtung findet. Diese Arbeit befasst sich mit 
dem möglichen Einfluss der Religion auf die Größe der Schattenwirtschaft. Dabei werden 
verschiedene Facetten religiöser Märkte berücksichtigt: das Ausmaß der allgemeinen Religio-
sität, der spezifische Einfluss unterschiedlicher Religionen, die Intensität des religiösen Wett-
bewerbs und die Nähe zwischen Religion und Staat. Beispielsweise ist eher eine kleinere 
Schattenwirtschaft in Ländern mit religiöser Bevölkerung und einer großen Nähe zwischen 
Religion und Staat zu erwarten. Ersteres sollte gelten, weil religiös fundierte ethische Normen 
die nicht-pekuniären Kosten ungesetzlicher informeller Transaktionen erhöhen. Letzteres ist 
zu vermuten, weil Religionsgemeinschaften die Interessen des Staates verteidigen sollten, 
wenn sie sich in einer engen Partnerschaft mit diesem befinden und davon profitieren. 
Die empirische Überprüfung dieser Hypothesen verwendet den derzeit größten verfügbaren 
Länderquerschnitt zur Größe der Schattenwirtschaft im internationalen Vergleich und ver-
knüpft diesen mit zahlreichen religiösen Indikatoren. Ökonometrischer Ausgangspunkt ist 
eine Basisspezifikation, in der die Größe der Schattenwirtschaft in Abhängigkeit von zentra-
len ökonomischen Determinanten modelliert wird. Diese Spezifikation wird dann um die po-
tenziellen religiösen Determinanten erweitert. Anschließend überprüfen wir die Robustheit 
der Schätzungen durch eine Serie von Tests. 
Insgesamt zeigen unsere Ergebnisse, dass Religion das Niveau informeller Transaktionen be-
einflusst, allerdings gelten Differenzierungen. So ist offenbar das Niveau der allgemeinen 
Religiosität nur von geringer Bedeutung. Demgegenüber zeigt sich eine signifikante Diver-
genz zwischen den wichtigsten Weltreligionen. Länder, die durch den Islam oder die östlichen 
Religionen dominiert werden, haben im Vergleich zu christlichen Ländern bei vergleichbarer 
ökonomischer Entwicklung und Qualität staatlicher Institutionen kleinere Schattenwirtschaf-
ten. Außerdem ist die Nähe zwischen Religion und Staat von signifikanter Bedeutung. Eine 
enge Beziehung zwischen beiden ist typisch für Länder mit einem geringen Anteil ökonomi-
scher Aktivitäten im informellen Sektor. Offenbar nutzen Religionsgemeinschaften ihren 
normativen Einfluss auf die Gläubigen als “übernatürliche Polizei”, um staatliche Interessen 
zu schützen, wenn sich Staat und Religion in einer reziproken Beziehung befinden. Die ver-
gleichsweise kleine Schattenwirtschaft in islamischen Staaten ist bemerkenswert angesichts 
der Skepsis islamischer Ethik gegenüber manchen modernen Formen der Besteuerung. Offen-
bar kompensieren dies die besonders engen Beziehungen zwischen Religion und Staat in is-
lamischen Ländern. Die meisten dieser signifikanten Ergebnisse werden nur von den Daten 
für Länder mit mittlerem und niedrigem Einkommen gestützt. Die Existenz einer Staatsreligi-
on in industrialisierten Ländern ist somit nicht von messbarer Bedeutung im Kontext der 
Schattenwirtschaft.  
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Abstract: Religion is increasingly acknowledged to be a cultural dimension which affects 
economic outcomes in different regards. This contribution focuses on religion’s possible im-
pact on the shadow economy. Different dimensions of the religious markets are taken into 
account. These dimensions refer to the overall degree of religiosity, the specific impact of 
different religions, religious competition or the proximity between religion and the state. The 
empirical test makes use of the largest available cross-section on the size of the shadow econ-
omy and matches this dataset with numerous religious indicators. Summary measures of gen-
eral religiosity or indicators of religious competition do not have a measurable impact. How-
ever, robust differences emerge across religions. Countries dominated by Islam or Eastern 
religions are associated with smaller shadow economies compared to Christian countries. Fur-
thermore, the proximity between state and religion matters. Close ties between both are typi-
cal for smaller shadow economies. This is in line with the view that religion uses its norma-
tive influence to protect state interests if there is a mutually beneficial relationship. 
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1. Introduction 
“Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's.” There is 
hardly a more prominent quote on the ethics of secular tax laws from a religious founder than 
Jesus’ statement in the Gospel of Matthew (22: 21). Asked by the Pharisees whether paying 
taxes to the Roman emperor is lawful, Jesus points to the portrait and inscription on the coin 
and gives his famous reply. If statements like this were just of relevance for the internal ethi-
cal debates of religious communities, they would be without any economic relevance. How-
ever, religion leaves its mark on ethical convictions and thus may indirectly impact on eco-
nomic preferences and behavior of its believers. Increasingly, the economic literature 
acknowledges the impact of culture in general and religion in particular on preferences and 
beliefs and, as a consequence, also on individual behavior like saving or education and mac-
roeconomic outcomes, such as growth (Barro and McCleary, 2003; Cornelißen, 2006).   
One particular potential effect of religion on aggregate economic outcomes, however, has so 
far not received any attention: Its impact on the size of the shadow economy. This is a re-
markable shortcoming given that religious teachings, like the one cited above, are so explicit 
about the required respect for a fiscal rules of the state. Instead, the existing literature on the 
shadow economy (surveyed in: Schneider and Enste, 2000; Feld and Schneider, 2010) ex-
plores the determinants of the hidden economy with an overwhelming focus on economic 
incentives related to taxes, bureaucracy, labor markets or corruption (e.g. Friedman et al., 
2000). Only few of the recent contributions look beyond the standard economic drivers: 
D’Hernoncourt and Méon (2008) explore the role of generalized trust in other people for a 
country cross-section and diagnose a robustly negative causal impact on the size of the shad-
ow economy. The idea that religion could have an impact on the extent of informal economic 
activities receives some indirect backing from the literature on tax morale. Religious respond-
ents to the World Value Survey in more than thirty countries signal higher tax morale 
(Torgler, 2006). This results holds independently whether religiosity is measured by member-
ship in a religious community, attendance of services or religious education, albeit with sub-
stantial heterogeneity across different religions and confessions.  
While the link between religion and (tax) ethics is an important first dimension of potential 
relevance for the shadow economy, the overall link is more complex. Tax evasion and shadow 
economic activities have a certain overlap, but the latter are also driven important factors be-
yond taxation such as the flight from regulation or corruption. Apart from that, religion has an 
impact beyond morale. Even with a comparable level of religiosity across countries, structural 
differences of religious markets may influence the informal sector. Religions differ with re-
spect to their precise ethical messages and have a different degree of flexibility vis-à-vis secu-
lar laws. National conditions differ as to the closeness between religion and state. With a 
close alliance between both, it is more likely that religion uses its influence on the followers 
for the interests of the state as well. Furthermore, there is a large variance of national religious 
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markets ranging from monopoly situations of one single religion up to a situation of religious 
pluralism. A situation of religious fractionalization may create more difficult conditions for 
informal transactions compared to a situation of a uniform religion. By analyzing these inter-
linkages, we hope to add a new dimension to the literature on the shadow economy and also 
expand on the economics of religion.  
In the following, we first derive hypotheses regarding the expected influence of religion and 
religious market’s specific features on the shadow economy. We then proceed by testing these 
hypotheses on the basis of a large cross-country sample and complement the analysis by a 
battery of robustness checks. It turns out that summary measures of general religiosity or in-
dicators of religious competition do not have a measurable impact. Yet, robust differences 
emerge across religions. Countries dominated by Islam or Eastern religions are associated 
with smaller shadow economies compared to Christian countries. This effect is, however, lim-
ited to low and middle income economies. Furthermore, the proximity between state and reli-
gion matters. Close ties, e.g. through legislation based on religious doctrines, are typical for 
countries with a lower share of economic activity in the informal economy. Again, this result 
does not hold for industrial countries but is driven by the less developed economies. This is in 
line with the view that religion uses its normative influence to protect state interests if there is 
a reciprocal relationship between the state and the religious community. 
 
2. Religion and the market for informal transactions 
According to a broad definition (for a discussion of definitions see: Schneider et al., 2010) the 
shadow economy comprises those economic activities which circumvent taxation, social secu-
rity contributions or bureaucratic costs related to the compliance with regulation (e.g. wage 
and job safety standards, statistical reporting). These activities as such may be legal;1 their 
concealment from public authorities, however, implies a breach of law.  
Any reflection whether to conceal transactions from public authorities implies a cost-benefit 
calculus. On the benefit side, the migration of activities from the official to the shadow econ-
omy promises cost savings related to taxes and social security contributions. In addition, the 
bureaucratic burden can be reduced and legal restrictions avoided, which increases the free-
dom of contracts in line with the contracting parties’ preferences (e.g. with respect to working 
hours or wages). On the cost side, the threat of pecuniary and non-pecuniary fines must be 
taken into account, which is a function of the size of fines and their probability. Furthermore, 
costs may emerge from informal transactions regularly foregoing legal protection for contrac-
                                                 
1 Illegal activities are a subsection of the shadow economy and include criminal activities such as burglary or 
drug dealing, which are usually summarized as “underground economy”. 
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tual enforcement. Frequently, contracts in the shadow economy are informal and contractual 
rights are harder to defend.2 
Religion may impact on this calculus in different respects: Due to any religion’s moral dimen-
sion, it could influence non-pecuniary fines related to the infringement on moral norms. Re-
ligiosity may also influence the conditions for informal transactions through its possible im-
pact on trust and trustworthiness. This general reasoning, however, has to be refined to allow 
for the diversity of religions and religious markets. In the following, we present these refine-
ments in the context of different testable hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A population’s general religiosity should impact on the size of the shad-
ow economy; possible counteracting effects leave the sign expectation unclear. 
Ethical convictions affect individual utility maximization. Subjects with ethical sensitivities 
face specific non-pecuniary fines with respect to transgressions. Transgressions can then cre-
ate a feeling of bad conscience, guilt, shame or embarrassment, and  can impair positive feel-
ings, such as self-esteem or a sense of integrity (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990). The prediction 
from neoclassical economic reasoning is clear: The existence of a moral norm should reduce 
the level of individual activity which is deemed to be immoral by the respective individual.3 
This augmentation of utility maximization is successfully applied in different contexts: Tax 
compliance is positively influenced by taxpayers’ ethical attitudes (Reckers et al., 1994; 
Andreoni et al., 1998); disincentives of the welfare state depend on ethical norms related to 
the honesty of welfare recipients (Lindbeck, 1995; Lindbeck et al., 1999); or the prevalence of 
crime is affected by a society’s ethical standards (Grasmick and Bursik, 1990).  
What holds for ethical norms in general may even have a stronger behavioral effect if these 
norms have a religious foundation. Already Adam Smith, in his “Theory of Moral Senti-
ments”, points to the ethical motivation caused by the religious belief in an “all-seeing Judge” 
and “a life to come” (Iannaccone, 1998: 1478). Thus, religion expands the universe of non-
pecuniary sanctions up to extreme fines, such as “hell” and “eternal condemnation”. Apart 
from that, religions often invest heavily into the education of their believers and monitor their 
behavior (Iannaccone, 1992, 1998). Importantly, the normative impact of religion may reach 
beyond its immediate followers. Ethical norms which have a religious past and origin may 
survive even if a society becomes largely atheist. Furthermore, religious persons’ behavioral 
                                                 
2 There may be alternatives to legal enforcement, such as social pressure or even unlawful types of pressure  like 
threat of violence. However, these types of enforcement mechanisms regularly imply higher costs and uncertain-
ties compared to standard mechanisms of legal protections. 
3 It should be stressed that this conscience constrained utility maximization should generally not be expected to 
result in a zero level of immoral activity. The marginal moral costs of the activity will be equalled to the margin-
al utility from the immoral activity with equilibrium well possible in the positive range of shadow activities. 
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example can influence non-believers: In the context of religion and crime, Hull (2000) finds 
that religious rules against crime also affect a community’s non-religious inhabitants. Overall, 
there is a rich empirical literature supporting the view that religion indeed has a dampening 
effect on phenomena like crime, suicide or drug and alcohol use (surveyed in: Iannaccone, 
1998; McCullough and Willoughby, 2009). 
Although different religions may put different emphases on the issue (see below), activities in 
the shadow economy should generally have a negative valuation by religions’ ethical stand-
ards. All world religions stress the importance of norms related to honesty, truthfulness and 
altruism. For example, the Ten Commandments, which are of authority for Jews and all 
Christian denominations alike, oblige not to steal or bear a false witness. Clearly, informal 
activities imply dishonesty (against the state) and damage for the state and the community and 
could be classified as a specific modern variant of theft. Therefore, the first straightforward 
expectation is that more religious countries should have smaller shadow economies. 
One additional possible impact of religiosity on the shadow economy, however, must be taken 
into consideration. The ethical obligation of religious people to act truthfully may render the 
costs of informality in terms of lacking legal contract enforcing low. Religion and its ethical 
constraints on transaction partners may offer a substitute for legal protection of (informal) 
contracts. Religion could then, through its effect on the trustworthiness of market participants, 
foster transactions in the shadow economy. If this effect outweighs the ethical effects, religi-
osity may be positively correlated with informal transactions. Thus, there is an unclear sign 
prediction for the overall effect of a population’s degree of religiosity. 
Religiosity has countless different appearances. As a consequence, the preceding general hy-
pothesis requires qualifications. Particular religions differ with respect to their view on the 
secular state and their conviction of a moral duty to comply with this state’s rules. The fol-
lowing hypothesis reflects this insight. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The size of the shadow economy should differ across countries depend-
ing on the specific type of religion. 
While a comprising comparative analysis of main religions’ position towards the fiscal laws 
of the modern state would be an ambitious interdisciplinary undertaking and, as such, beyond 
the scope of our analysis, a few short remarks on a range of important world religions are 
helpful. 
 
Jewish Orthodoxy 
The perspective of Jewish orthodoxy on the respect of a state’s rule in general and tax rule in 
particular are rather strict. According to Cohn (1998), Jews have a duty to follow their coun-
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try’s statutes. Exceptions might only be possible if the government is based on brute force. 
The laws of secular democracies, however, have to be respected. Moreover, evading taxes 
would contradict Jewish ethics because it implies lying and because for a Jewish orthodox any 
behavior which could discredit his religion is prohibited. Finally, secular sanctions, like being 
imprisoned, also have a religious dimension since they limit the possibility to properly prac-
tice Judaism and must therefore be avoided (for a critical view on these views: McGee, 2006).  
 
Catholicism 
The biblical message for the Christian ethics of the shadow economy is unequivocal given the 
authority of the Ten Commandments and Jesus’ prominent statement with respect to the issue 
of tax evasion as cited at the outset. In the fiscal respect, the Roman Empire with its exhaus-
tive system of tax collection can be regarded as a predecessor to the modern fiscal state. 
Against this background, the Christian New Testament clearly points the way towards a criti-
cal ethical view on non-compliance with the legal rules of the modern welfare and tax state. In 
its official Catechism from 1993, the Catholic Church (Vatican, 1993) summarizes its current 
ethical teaching with an interpretation of the Seventh Commandment (“You shall not steal”) 
and extends this obligation to public property and revenues. It explicitly mentions tax evasion 
as “morally illicit” (Nb. 2409) and criticizes the second important dimension of informal eco-
nomic activities (“it is unjust not to pay the social security contributions required by legiti-
mate authority”, Nb. 2436). 
 
Orthodox Christianity 
In the Eastern Orthodox tradition there is a strong tradition of close ties between the church 
and the state (Mavrogordatos, 2000). In this tradition “God is Caesar's junior partner" 
(Huntington, 1997: 70), which stands in contrast to the course of the Western Church, and 
offenses against the state were also religious offenses (Torgler, 2006). However, most ortho-
dox countries have been subject to the anti-religious suppression in the Communist era, an 
experience which might have permanently weakened the mental power of this past alliance.  
 
Protestantism 
The specific economic preferences of the Protestant denominations within Christianity have 
been in the interest of research at least since Max Weber’s “The Protestant Ethic and the Spir-
it of Capitalism” from 1904. Weber ascribes to Protestantism a particular work ethic and, re-
cently (Becker and Woessmann, 2009), particularly heavy investment into human capital ben-
efitting development and growth. The conclusions with respect to the ethics of the shadow 
economy are more difficult to draw, not least because Protestantism has no single top authori-
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ty like the Catholic Church which would be able to define its official teaching. Based on Lu-
ther’s writing, however, one can argue that Protestantism fosters the respect of the secular 
state. In Luther’s famous doctrine of the “Two Kingdoms” (Whitford, 2005), the reformer 
differentiates between the secular (“the Law”) and the religious kingdom (“the Gospel”) with 
its specific obligations. He acknowledges the necessity of the law, which limits chaos and 
evil. Luther thus prepares the ground for the autonomy of and respect for the rules of the secu-
lar state as long as this state does not infringe on the religious sphere. In addition, in line with 
Weber’s views, one could argue that Protestants should support the success of modern capital-
ism including its rules on taxes, the welfare state and other regulations. There is, however, a 
specific counter-argument: People with a Protestant work ethic tend to believe in hard work 
and personal effort and could thus be less likely to accept taxes or social security contribu-
tions related to redistribution. Furnham (1983) finds experimental evidence that Protestant 
work ethics often result in an opposition to taxes.  
 
Islam 
According to McGee’s survey (1997), Islamic ethics imply a differentiated ethical view with 
respect to modern types of taxes. While the payment of Zakat (a small percentage of wealth 
for the poor and needy) is a religious obligation, the government has a limited legitimacy to 
raise taxes. Several tax types are not legitimate, such as taxes which increase consumer prices 
or an inheritance tax. Proportionate taxes due to their similarity to the proportionate Zakat are 
easier to defend compared to progressive taxes. Neither is the non-compliance with certain 
government regulations always deemed to be immoral. This applies to certain trade regula-
tions which only benefit a limited number of people or which actually harm the general pub-
lic. It is obvious that these kinds of religious reservations against certain types of regulation 
and important pillars of many modern tax systems might also imply a more relaxed view on 
informal transactions. 
 
Buddhism and Hinduism 
The fundamental aim of Buddhism is salvation, which means to enter the Nirvana by exiting 
the cycle of rebirth (Keown, 2005). The future existence in the cycle of rebirth is determined 
by the collected Karma. Good actions lead to good Karma whereas bad actions lead to bad 
Karma. Actions which evolve from greed, hatred and delusion are considered bad. In contrast, 
actions which evolve from non-attachment, benevolence and understanding are considered 
good. A virtue which is considered highly important by Buddhists is generosity. Thus, Bud-
dhist ethics propagate altruistic behavior by despising greed or dishonesty and denying an 
overemphasis on one’s own well-being. It appears obvious that all this should imply a nega-
tive view on shadow economy activities. 
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Basic principles of Hinduism are, amongst others, the belief in the cycle of rebirth (and the 
possible exit through salvation), the belief in Karma theory and the caste system (Becke, 
1996). With these considerations in mind, a similar argument to the one made with Buddhism 
is applicable. Possibly, the view that an individual’s social position (“caste”) is predetermined 
could be linked to a more critical view on redistributive taxation which does not respect the 
given order. 
 
Of course, any such attempt to briefly characterize the rich facets of different religions’ ethi-
cal views relevant for the shadow economy must remain highly superficial. However, even 
this very brief discussion supports the expectation that not only religion as such but also the 
specific type of religion could be relevant for the size of the shadow economy. An empirical 
testing strategy should reflect this insight. Torgler (2006) is an important example for such an 
approach. In his empirical scrutiny of religion and tax morale based on individual cross-
section data from the World Value Survey, he finds that Catholics, Hindus and Buddhists 
have higher tax morale than people without a religious denomination. Orthodox Christians 
and Protestants show lower tax morale compared to their non-religious compatriots whereas 
Jews and Moslems do not differ significantly. 
Beyond the specific normative contents of a religious community, the characteristics and the 
degree of competition of the national religious market may matter. This leads us to the third 
hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The size of the shadow economy should be related to the fragmentation 
of the market shares of religions with an unclear sign prediction. 
The degree of religious fragmentation and competition could matter in several respects. On 
the one hand, with one dominant religion the state has one single potential ally for any strate-
gy to enforce state rules also through religious assistance. With religious fragmentation any 
such alliance is more difficult to achieve. 
On the other hand, a monopolistic situation of one religious supplier could result in less effi-
ciency in providing religious services and influencing social norms. Religious pluralism offers 
a wider choice for the population and thus a better fit to the diverse religious needs. The link 
between religious competition and religious activity has attracted considerable attention in the 
empirical literature on the economics of religion. Several authors find that competition results 
in higher religious participation (Finke and Iannaccone, 1993; for a survey on that literature 
see Sherkat and Ellison, 1999; Barro and McCleary, 2003), with opposing views from Olson 
(1999) and Voas (2002). If the link actually exists, we expect that low religious diversity 
should rather weaken religion’s power to control people and to influence their social norms. 
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Both mentioned effects are countervailing so that we do not have a clear sign expectation for 
the impact of religious fragmentation. 
A further dimension of a religious market relates to the formal ties between religion and the 
state. This leads us to the fourth hypothesis. 
  
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Countries with an established state church should have smaller shadow 
economies. 
The relation between religious organizations and the state can range from deep mutual hostili-
ty up to almost identity in the case of the state being based on religious laws and religious 
leaders endowed with secular power. We would expect that the willingness of religious au-
thority to protect the property and interests of the state is influenced by the proximity between 
both. A state religion which enjoys diverse financial and regulatory privileges under protec-
tion from secular authorities should have an institutional self-interest to defend this state. 
Therefore, we would expect such a religion to also use its normative teaching, monitoring and 
sanctioning of followers for supporting fiscal rules and government regulation. Religion as a 
“supernatural police” (Anderson and Tollison, 1992) should be most active in the interest of 
the state if it stands in a close reciprocal relationship to the latter. 
 
  
3. Data and Econometric Results 
 
3.1. Data sources 
For the size of the shadow economy, we make use of the data for 162 countries from Schnei-
der, Buehn and Montenegro (2010: Table 2). The authors base their calculations on a Multiple 
Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model4, which is a particular type of a structural equa-
tions model. The shadow economy is treated in this approach as a latent variable for which 
information is available through two types of observables, namely causal and indicator varia-
bles. Causal variables relate to the factors which explain the existence and growth of the 
shadow economy (e.g. fiscal burden on official transactions, regulation). Indicator variables 
measure phenomena related to shadow activities, such as the increased circulation of cash. A 
characteristic limitation of the MIMIC approach is that it only provides relative, not absolute, 
estimates of the size of the shadow economy. Additional calibration procedures are required 
in order to calculate absolute values of the size of the shadow economy. This limitation, how-
                                                 
4 For methodological details and a brief survey of the recent MIMIC-based shadow economy literature see 
Schneider, Buehn and Montenegro (2010). 
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ever, is less of a concern in this study’s context where we are not particularly interested in the 
absolute size of shadow economies but rather in their international variance.  
As (economic) determinants of informal transactions, we take account of factors related to the 
general level of a country’s economic development, job opportunities in the official labor 
market, incentives related to regulation, corruption or taxation. Therefore, we include the fol-
lowing measures as standard determinants into our baseline: Real GDP per capita, unem-
ployment rate, government effectiveness, size of government, business freedom, fiscal free-
dom and freedom from corruption (this specific choice is also driven by data restrictions in-
herent to a large country including many low income economies; for details and summary 
statistics see appendix). 
For religious data we make use of several data sources. The Religion and State Project (RAS) 
provides information on the relationship between religion and the state in more than 170 
countries. This project is located at Bar-Ilan University. Its goal is to provide measures which 
quantify the link between government and religion, but it also offers a rich set of more general 
religious indicators.5 The RAS project covers all countries with a population of at least 
250.000 in the year 2000 as well as Western Democracies with lower populations. Data com-
prise a time span between 1990 and 2002;6 population statistics, however, are only available 
on a cross-section basis with observations around the year 2000. Sources for the RAS data-
base are human rights reports and academic as well as news media sources (Fox, 2004). The 
RAS database is complemented by the data set collected by Fox and Tabory (2008) in the 
context of their study dealing with the impact of state regulation of religion on religious par-
ticipation and belief. Finally, we also employ survey results from Gallup World, which are 
used for the cross-section quantification of overall religiosity over a large set of countries. 
The low time variance of religious phenomena in addition to the lacking availability of time 
series of religious population data limit any empirical approach to cross-section analyses. In 
the following testing of the four key hypotheses, we include the following rich set of religious 
indicators (see Table 1 for descriptive statistics and Table A-1 in the appendix for exact defi-
nitions and sources). 
 
                                                 
5 For further details on the Religion and State Project see www.thearda.com/ras/. 
6 States which became independent during that time were included beginning in the year of independence and 
those states in a state of Civil War were included as soon as a functioning government was in place again. 
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Table 1: Summary statistics religious variables 
Variable  Number 
of obser-
vations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
General religiosity 
Religion important (population share in %), Gallup 149 72.09 25.62 12.00 99.00 
Attending weekly (population share in %), Gallup 148 49.60 22.31 10.00 93.00 
Confidence in religious organization (population share 
in %), Gallup 
139 69.41 16.82 24.00 95.00 
Gallup religiosity indicator 135 63.93 20.17 22.00 92.60 
Attending monthly (population share in %), 
WVS/ISSP 
80 39.67 24.67 3.10 95.20 
Attending weekly (population share in %), WVS/ISSP 80 36.07 28.86 2.20 99.10 
Considering oneself religious (population share in %), 
WVS/ISSP 
70 70.95 19.68 14.70 98.60 
Specific religions 
Christian population share in % 171 51.61 37.76 0.00 99.30 
Islam population share in % 166 27.94 37.04 0.00 99.80 
Other religions’ population share in % 160 16.79 24.86 0.00 98.80 
Non-religious population share in % 155 5.25 12.83 0.00 98.00 
Religious fragmentation and competition 
Population share majority religion in % 174 68.53 21.48 22.80 100.00 
Herfindahl index religions’ population shares 81 0.56 0.23 0.18 0.97 
Dummy established state religion 174 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
Closeness between religion and state 
Composite indicator on closeness between religion 
and state 
174 23.89 16.71 0.00 77.56 
Dummy religious laws influence legislation 174 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Indicator discrimination against minority religions 174 5.49 7.56 0.00 38.00 
Dummy mandatory religious education 174 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00 
Dummy government collects taxes on behalf of reli-
gious organizations 
174 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00 
Dummy government funding of clergy 174 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
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Indicators related to H1 and religiosity in general  
H1 relates to religiosity in general independent from a country’s specific religious situation. 
Available indicators relate to religious practice as pursued through the regular attendance of 
religious services or the visit of places of worship. In addition, the individual’s subjective 
assessment of the importance of religion for one’s own life offers an alternative unrelated to 
physical presence at places like churches, mosques or other places of worship. Relevant sur-
vey results originate from two different sources: The World Value Survey and Gallup World. 
In addition, the estimations include the Gallup World Religiosity Index as a composite indica-
tor which is based on three dimensions: The attendance of religious services, confidence in 
religious communities and the importance assigned to religion (for the precise definition and 
source of data see Table A-1 in the appendix).   
 
Indicators related to H2 and specific religions 
For testing the impact of a specific religion, the RAS classification of countries according to 
their majority religions is the starting point. Two different levels of aggregation are employed 
which are also guided by the empirical necessity to avoid too small classes (see Table 2). Of 
course, any such classification has several shortcomings. The within class homogeneity is 
highly different: While Catholicism and its ethical teaching is highly centralized on a global 
level, this is already very different for Protestantism or Orthodox Christianity with their de-
centralized structures. The within heterogeneity is, obviously, extreme for the “other”-
category. Furthermore, the classification according to majority religions hides the fact that the 
degree of majority may differ between a truly uniform religious denomination of a country’s 
population and a rather diversified religious market where, however, one religion has a (thin) 
majority. Therefore, we include the continuous shares of main religions, which is only availa-
ble from the RAS database for a high aggregation (Christian, Islam, and “Other”), as an alter-
native measure in the test.  
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Table 2: Classifications of countries according to majority religion 
Second aggregation 
(“broad differences”) 
First aggregation 
(“fine differences”) 
RAS classification 
Christian 96 
Catholic 43 Catholic 43 
Orthodox 12 Orthodox  12 
Protestant 16 Protestant  16 
Christian (general) 25 Christian (general) 25 
Islam 46 Islam 46 
Islam, Sunni 34 
Islam, Shi’i 3 
Islam, other 1 
Islam (general) 8 
Other 32 
Buddhist or Hindu 10 
Buddhist 8 
Hindu 2 
Other 22 
Jewish 1 
Animist 4 
Other 5 
Mixed  12 
Total 174  174  174 
    
 
Indicators related to H3 and to religious fragmentation and competition 
Different alternatives are employed to depict a country’s religious diversity. First, we make 
use of the Herfindahl index, which was calculated on the basis of population data and reli-
gious shares from the World Christian Encyclopedia (Fox and Tabory, 2008). It is above 0.9 
for several countries with a Muslim population (Morocco, Turkey, Algeria, Pakistan, Iran), 
but some Christian countries also reach levels above 0.8 (e.g. Malta, Poland, Greece, Spain). 
As an alternative, the population percentage share of the largest religion is used. This rather 
measures the power of the dominant religious player than describing the overall competitive 
situation like the Herfindahl index. Finally, an important dimension of religious competition 
is state intervention in the religious market. To control for this aspect of (reduced) competi-
tion, we employ a dummy variable which equals one if there is an established religion benefit-
ting from state protection as the official religion of a country. 
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Indicators related to H4 and to the closeness of religion and state 
The links between (the dominant) religion and the state is quantified along different dimen-
sions through the RAS indicators. We include several of these dimensions with a particular 
appeal for the question under scrutiny into our testing. One of the country dummies is equal to 
one if a country’s legislation is classified as “substantially religious” or the religious law is 
even state law. In this case, state laws should clearly have a substantial religious authority in 
the realm of taxation as well. Further dummies identify countries where religious education is 
mandatory in public schools, where the government collects taxes on behalf of religious or-
ganizations or where the clergy is at least partially funded by the government. Whereas man-
datory religious education simplifies the normative impact of religion on the population, reli-
gious tax collection and tax financed clergy underline the self-interest of religious organiza-
tions in suppressing shadow activities. Two additional composite indicators are used: One 
measures the degree to which the state discriminates against minority religions and thus pro-
tects the dominant religion in a particularly aggressive way. The expectation is that the domi-
nant religion should, in exchange for this protection, protect the government’s interests. Final-
ly, the overall indicator on the closeness between religion and state, which combines all as-
pects included in the RAS project,7 is used as well. 
 
 
3.2. Descriptive Analysis 
Figure 1 relates to the first hypothesis and the impact of religiosity in general. Countries are 
classified into the deciles of the Gallup indicator of religiosity. Clearly, less religious coun-
tries have smaller GDP shares of informal transactions.  
  
                                                 
7 The composite RAS indicator includes the following dimensions: Official support or suppression of main reli-
gion and of minority religions, religious regulation and restrictions, and the extent of legislation based on reli-
gious doctrines; for details see Fox (2004). 
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Figure 1: General religiosity and size of the shadow economy 
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Figure 2 presents the mean size of the shadow economy for countries classified according to 
their majority religions. Most classes have similar means between 30 and 35 % of GDP. The 
only cases divergent from this simple comparison are countries dominated by Orthodox and 
Protestant Christians with the former having larger and the latter lower shadow economies 
compared to the other religious groupings. 
 
Figure 2: Dominant religion and the size of shadow economy 
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Findings for religious competition according to Hypothesis 3 are mixed: No clear correlation 
between the Herfindahl index of the religious markets and the size of the shadow economy is 
detectable (Figure 3). However, Figure 4 indicates that countries with an established state 
religion indeed have fewer shadow activities. 
 
Figure 3:  Religious competition and the size of the shadow economy 
0
20
40
60
80
A
ve
ra
ge
 s
iz
e 
sh
ad
ow
 e
co
no
m
y 
in
 %
G
D
P
 1
99
9-
20
07
.2 .4 .6 .8 1
Herfindahl index religious market
 
 
Figure 4: State religion and the shadow economy 
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The final descriptive country classification looks for the empirical content of Hypothesis 4. A 
similar impression originates from the composite RAS indicator on the proximity between 
religion and the state. The country groups in the two top deciles of the indicator are character-
ized both by a particular strong link between religious and secular powers and, at the same 
time, relatively small shadow-GDP-shares. 
Figure 5: RAS indicator and the size of the shadow economy 
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Of course, any such bivariate correlations can be highly influenced by third factors. Thus, it is 
well possible that the negative correlation between GDP and religiosity could be behind the 
pattern of Figure 1 (the correlation coefficient of GDP per capita and the indicator of religiosi-
ty is -0.52). Accordingly, we turn to the multivariate testing.  
 
3.3. Econometric Evidence 
The econometric cross-section testing is based on a baseline specification which includes a 
standard set of determinants of shadow activities as identified in the relevant literature (Table 
3): The potential controls (column 1) relate to the level of economic development (GDP), 
government effectiveness, working opportunities in the official sector (unemployment rate), 
different dimensions of economic freedom representing tax and regulatory incentives for in-
formal activities and a country’s degree of corruption (for summary statistics and data sources 
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see appendix). In both the baseline and the subsequent estimations, wherever available, data 
refers to the year 2000 or close to this reference year. A general to specific testing recom-
mends limiting the set of controls to GDP per capita and government effectiveness (column 
2).8 However, the other controls are included in the final robustness checks of our key results 
(see below section 3.4). Whereas the included regressions all apply OLS, we also report vari-
ants in the subsequent robustness check section. The baseline reconfirms that the size of the 
shadow economy is a negative function of economic development and government effective-
ness.  
 
Table 3: Baseline 
 (1) (2) 
GDP per capita -0.364*** -0.287*** 
 (0.116) (0.0936) 
Government effectiveness -5.332*** -6.147*** 
 (1.877) (1.209) 
Size of government 0.168  
 (0.148)  
Unemployment rate -0.127  
 (0.146)  
Business freedom 0.00838  
 (0.0889)  
Fiscal freedom 0.0904  
 (0.0596)  
Freedom from corruption -0.0124  
 (0.0701)  
Constant 30.05*** 36.74*** 
 (6.479) (1.223) 
Observations 141 151 
R-squared 0.550 0.530 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
To test for the consistency of the shadow data heterogeneity with Hypothesis 1, we extend the 
baseline to include our measures of general religiosity, still without paying any interest to 
cross-religion differences. We do so (Tables 4-6) for the whole sample and for samples split 
into high income and middle/low income countries (World Bank classification). Overall, gen-
eral religiosity does not appear to be highly important to understand country heterogeneity. 
Only for the World Value Survey indicators (weekly church attendance and self-reported re-
ligiosity) a significant positive effect on the size of the shadow economy can be detected. This 
effect originates from the poorer countries’ subsample. The sign points to the transaction sim-
plifying effect of religiosity. These effects are, however, not confirmed by the similar Gallup 
indicators, which cover a much larger country set and, thus, cannot be regarded as robust. 
 
                                                 
8 For smaller country cross-sections focussing, for example, on industrial countries, a much richer baseline could 
be chosen. This is, however, precluded for our extensive country set including many developing countries. 
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Table 4: Impact of general religiosity (H1) – all countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita -0.368*** -0.344*** -0.339*** -0.345*** -0.139 -0.127 
 (0.105) (0.107) (0.106) (0.108) (0.184) (0.184) 
Government effectiveness -5.324*** -6.037*** -5.213*** -5.699*** -6.803*** -7.003*** 
 (1.476) (1.470) (1.507) (1.581) (2.334) (2.375) 
Attendance religious service  0.020      
(Gallup) (0.043)      
Confidence in Religion  -0.004     
(Gallup)  (0.057)     
Religion important    0.038    
(Gallup)   (0.040)    
Religiosity Index     0.0120   
(Gallup)    (0.0539)   
Weekly attendance      0.1374***  
(WVS)     (0.040)  
Consider oneself religious       0.103* 
(WVS)      (0.058) 
Constant 37.05*** 38.39*** 34.82*** 37.20*** 29.76*** 26.11*** 
 (2.444) (4.151) (3.181) (3.692) (2.772) (4.872) 
Observations 131 125 132 124 77 67 
R-squared 0.568 0.578 0.553 0.567 0.608 0.564 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 5: Impact of general religiosity (H1) – high income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita -0.204** -0.206** -0.236*** -0.229** -0.307** -0.312** 
 (0.086) (0.089) (0.082) (0.088) (0.129) (0.125) 
Government effectiveness -5.504*** -5.168*** -4.461** -4.610** -3.855* -3.108 
 (1.721) (1.459) (1.814) (1.778) (2.085) (2.049) 
Attendance religious service  -0.018      
(Gallup) (0.055)      
Confidence in Religion   -0.003     
(Gallup)  (0.063)     
Religion important    0.022    
(Gallup)   (0.043)    
Religiosity Index    0.026   
(Gallup)    (0.061)   
Weekly attendance     0.002  
(WVS)     (0.047)  
Consider oneself religious       0.067 
(WVS)      (0.048) 
Constant 33.36*** 32.55*** 31.16*** 31.05*** 33.07*** 27.82*** 
 (3.080) (3.711) (3.514) (3.799) (2.569) (4.236) 
Observations 43 41 43 41 36 35 
R-squared 0.542 0.526 0.543 0.529 0.575 0.582 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Impact of general religiosity (H1) – middle and low income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita -0.652 -0.828 -0.474 -0.701 0.541 0.053 
 (0.458) (0.520) (0.470) (0.539) (0.675) (0.709) 
Government effectiveness -3.561 -3.705 -4.374* -3.920 -12.29*** -11.70** 
 (2.405) (2.602) (2.446) (2.637) (4.488) (5.121) 
Attendance religious service  0.007      
(Gallup) (0.061)      
Confidence in Religion   -0.098     
(Gallup)  (0.092)     
Religion important    0.031    
(Gallup)   (0.062)    
Religiosity Index    -0.049   
(Gallup)    (0.085)   
Weekly attendance     0.219***  
(WVS)     (0.063)  
Consider oneself religious       0.157 
(WVS)      (0.105) 
Constant 40.12*** 48.81*** 36.66*** 44.20*** 20.84*** 19.74* 
 (4.793) (8.416) (6.370) (7.639) (6.308) (9.779) 
Observations 87 83 88 82 40 32 
R-squared 0.123 0.143 0.121 0.122 0.356 0.238 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In the next step, the empirical content of Hypothesis 2 is tested employing the fine and the 
broad classification of majority religions and the continuous population shares of major reli-
gions (Tables 7-9). Again, we also include sub-sample estimations across income classes 
(columns 2 and 3). For the fine classification (Table 7), the Orthodox Christian countries are 
chosen as the reference case. No significant differences can be detected for Roman Catholic 
countries whereas all other religions are associated with smaller shadow economies. The ef-
fects are less pronounced for Protestant and other Christian countries but particularly marked 
for the Islam, the Buddhist/Hindu and the “Other” category, which all have shadow econo-
mies that are nine to eleven percentage points of GDP smaller compared to the Orthodox ref-
erence case. These findings already point to Christian countries having a significantly larger 
shadow economy (for comparable levels of development and government effectiveness). This 
general tendency is reconfirmed both by the broader country classification (Table 8) and the 
test based on main religions’ population shares (Table 9) where non-Christian religious orien-
tation is always associated with a lower extent of informal transactions – even compared to 
countries with a larger non-religious population share. The sub-samples indicate that these 
overall findings originate largely from middle and low income countries; for industrialized 
countries religion dummies and population shares lose significance – with the exception of 
the Islam dummy in the fine classification.  
Given the reflections on the religions’ ethical messages above, the findings considering the 
sign of the Islam dummy and population share may come as a particular surprise since Islamic 
ethics apparently imply some objections at least to certain types of modern taxation. In spite 
of this, Islam countries do not have larger black economies compared to Christian countries of 
a similar stage of development. 
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Table 7: Impact of majority religion (H2) - fine differences 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Total High income Middle/low 
income 
GDP per capita -0.266*** -0.076 -0.819** 
 (0.094) (0.098) (0.374) 
Government effectiveness -6.668*** -6.018*** -4.189** 
 (1.276) (1.663) (2.038) 
Catholic -3.953 -4.140 -3.648 
 (3.087) (4.020) (3.943) 
Protestant -6.948* -5.191 -11.68** 
 (3.709) (4.331) (5.537) 
Other Christian -5.901* -6.369 -6.152 
 (3.243) (4.176) (4.268) 
Islam -9.412*** -8.411* -11.40*** 
 (3.086) (4.728) (3.881) 
Buddhist/Hindu -10.97***  -14.27*** 
 (3.987)  (4.885) 
Other  -9.116*** -7.249 -11.35** 
 (3.391) (4.639) (4.342) 
Constant 43.29*** 35.62*** 48.44*** 
 (2.915) (4.039) (4.350) 
Observations 148 46 101 
R-squared 0.573 0.541 0.267 
Reference case majority religion dummies: Orthodox Christian, standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 8: Impact of majority religion (H2) - broad differences 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Total High income Middle/low 
income 
GDP per capita -0.251*** -0.070 -0.573 
 (0.094) (0.097) (0.355) 
Government effectiveness -7.127*** -6.350*** -4.984** 
 (1.244) (1.571) (1.984) 
Islam -5.123*** -4.026 -6.640*** 
 (1.814) (3.101) (2.271) 
Other -5.320*** -2.523 -7.545*** 
 (1.929) (2.802) (2.510) 
Constant 38.72*** 31.15*** 42.39*** 
 (1.323) (2.000) (2.538) 
Observations 148 46 101 
R-squared 0.559 0.510 0.225 
Reference case majority religion dummies: Christian, standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Impact of majority religion (H2) – religious shares 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Total High income Middle/low 
income 
GDP per capita -0.316*** 0.009 -0.760* 
 (0.116) (0.145) (0.397) 
Government effectiveness -6.148*** -7.061*** -4.295** 
 (1.447) (1.874) (2.094) 
Share Islam -0.0651*** -0.0614 -0.0840*** 
 (0.0223) (0.0380) (0.0281) 
Share other religions -0.0636** -0.0387 -0.0996** 
 (0.0304) (0.0398) (0.0418) 
Share no religion -0.165** -0.0355 -0.193** 
 (0.0647) (0.0875) (0.0827) 
Constant 40.24*** 30.66*** 44.52*** 
 (1.661) (2.687) (2.979) 
Observations 133 41 91 
R-squared 0.564 0.513 0.256 
Reference case religious shares: Christian share, standard errors in parentheses, 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
The regressions of Tables 10-12 account for different degrees of competition at the national 
markets for religion. The results which relate to Hypothesis 3 do not point to any strong im-
pact: For none of the included three indicators (Herfindahl, population share of the majority 
religion and the state religion dummy) any significant effect emerges for the full sample or 
the middle and low income subsample. Only for high income countries, there is a significant 
positive sign for the Herfindahl index. Ceteris paribus, industrial countries with more intense 
religious competition have smaller shadow economies compared to less competitive coun-
tries. For industrial countries, this result supports the view that low religious competition re-
duces the power and normative influence of religious communities on their followers. How-
ever, the lacking robustness of this finding must be stressed. Even for the industrial countries, 
the effect of the Herfindahl index cannot be reproduced for the two alternative indicators of 
competition. 
 
Table 10: Impact of religious competition (H3) – all countries 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GDP per capita -0.200 -0.280*** -0.263*** 
 (0.200) (0.095) (0.096) 
Government effectiveness  -7.795*** -6.172*** -6.249*** 
 (2.556) (1.234) (1.234) 
Herfindahl index religious diversity -2.204   
 (4.749)   
Population share majority religion  0.0171  
  (0.0339)  
Established religion   -1.317 
   (1.728) 
Constant 37.39*** 35.62*** 36.93*** 
 (3.238) (2.533) (1.255) 
Observations 78 148 148 
R-squared 0.546 0.522 0.523 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0. 
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Table 11: Impact of religious competition (H3) – high income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GDP per capita -0.389*** -0.164** -0.152* 
 (0.124) (0.077) (0.083) 
Government effectiveness  -2.344 -4.826*** -4.971*** 
 (1.988) (1.186) (1.236) 
Herfindahl index religious diversity 7.273**   
 (3.371)   
Population share majority religion  0.0323  
  (0.0334)  
Established religion   0.268 
   (1.837) 
Constant 29.15*** 28.81*** 30.81*** 
 (2.752) (2.896) (2.022) 
Observations 37 46 46 
R-squared 0.628 0.494 0.483 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 12: Impact of religious competition (H3) – middle and low income 
 (1) (2) (3) 
GDP per capita -0.120 -0.308 -0.302 
 (0.750) (0.370) (0.364) 
Government effectiveness  -9.800* -5.476** -5.176** 
 (5.053) (2.097) (2.100) 
Herfindahl index religious diversity -8.517   
 (9.001)   
Population share majority religion  0.0036  
  (0.0502)  
Established religion   -2.444 
   (2.469) 
Constant 40.42*** 37.40*** 38.28*** 
 (6.367) (3.963) (2.378) 
Observations 40 101 101 
R-squared 0.161 0.120 0.128 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Our further set of regressions focuses on the links between a country’s dominant religion and 
the secular authorities (Hypothesis 4). Actually, the overall RAS indicator, which combines 
numerous dimensions in the relation between religion and the state, is significant for the over-
all sample with the expected sign (Table 13): A larger proximity between religious and state 
organizations is associated with a smaller shadow economy. This general finding is reiterated 
for some of the sub-dimensions: For countries where laws have at least partially a foundation 
in religious doctrines, where the government tends to discriminate against other religions to 
the advantage of the government’s religious partner or where religious education is mandatory 
in public schools. A look at the subsamples reveals specific differences (Tables 14-15): The 
effects of proximity are limited to middle and low income countries whereas no significances 
can be observed in the sample with industrial countries. We also include regressions limited 
to the dominantly Christian (Table 16) and Islamic (Table 17) countries. Interestingly, for 
Christian countries the significant coefficients have an opposite sign with strong ties between 
religion and the state being rather typical for countries with larger shadow economies. The 
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Islamic countries, by contrast, confirm the overall result with even higher negative coeffi-
cients. 
 
Table 13: Impact of ties between state and religion (H4) – all countries 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GDP per capita -0.238** -0.235** -0.227** -0.222** -0.276*** -0.278*** 
 (0.094) (0.095) (0.095) (0.0961) (0.0949) (0.0960) 
Government effectiveness -6.658*** -6.732*** -6.840*** -6.806*** -6.067*** -6.197*** 
 (1.223) (1.229) (1.234) (1.241) (1.276) (1.235) 
Index religion and state -0.110**      
 (0.0439)      
Religious laws  -4.527**     
  (1.846)     
Discrimination minority relig.   -0.264**    
   (0.103)    
Mandatory relig. education    -4.512**   
    (1.955)   
Religious taxes     -0.972  
     (2.557)  
Government pays clergy      0.258 
      (1.719) 
Constant 38.89*** 37.21*** 37.57*** 36.97*** 36.84*** 36.69*** 
 (1.482) (1.221) (1.247) (1.212) (1.259) (1.268) 
Observations 148 148 148 148 148 148 
R-squared 0.541 0.540 0.542 0.538 0.522 0.521 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 14: Impact of ties between state and religion (H4) – high income  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita -0.118 -0.128 -0.092 -0.139 -0.136* -0.147* 
 (0.085) (0.088) (0.090) (0.0968) (0.0771) (0.0776) 
Government effectiveness -5.590*** -5.431*** -5.928*** -5.185*** -5.311*** -5.031*** 
 (1.373) (1.469) (1.405) (1.567) (1.218) (1.186) 
Index religion and state -0.0455      
 (0.0575)      
Religious laws  -1.169     
  (2.526)     
Discrimination minority relig.   -0.156    
   (0.136)    
Mandatory relig. education    -0.432   
    (2.768)   
Religious taxes     1.555  
     (1.817)  
Government pays clergy      -0.0932 
      (1.614) 
Constant 31.77*** 31.02*** 31.12*** 30.86*** 30.41*** 30.87*** 
 (2.318) (2.045) (1.997) (2.020) (2.055) (2.076) 
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
R-squared 0.491 0.486 0.499 0.483 0.492 0.483 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Impact of ties between state and religion (H4) – middle and low income 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita -0.225 -0.324 -0.284 -0.321 -0.303 -0.321 
 (0.356) (0.355) (0.354) (0.355) (0.364) (0.369) 
Government effectiveness -5.051** -4.951** -5.093** -4.887** -5.322** -5.523*** 
 (2.034) (2.039) (2.031) (2.041) (2.087) (2.096) 
Index religion and state -0.148**      
 (0.0596)      
Religious laws  -6.067**     
  (2.475)     
Discrimination minority relig.   -0.349**    
   (0.139)    
Mandatory relig. education    -6.526**   
    (2.639)   
Religious taxes     -5.499  
     (5.947)  
Government pays clergy      0.897 
      (2.597) 
Constant 40.96*** 39.14*** 39.54*** 39.05*** 37.86*** 37.50*** 
 (2.601) (2.312) (2.352) (2.300) (2.300) (2.328) 
Observations 101 101 101 101 101 101 
R-squared 0.172 0.171 0.173 0.172 0.127 0.121 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 16: Impact of ties between state and religion (H4) – Christian majority religion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita -0.340** -0.329** -0.345** -0.324** -0.341** -0.372** 
 (0.144) (0.146) (0.143) (0.147) (0.146) (0.147) 
Government effectiveness -6.928*** -7.082*** -6.737*** -7.108*** -7.225*** -6.978*** 
 (1.674) (1.697) (1.668) (1.709) (1.747) (1.684) 
Index religion and state 0.136*      
 (0.0812)      
Religious laws  4.405     
  (4.626)     
Discrimination minority relig.   0.418*    
   (0.215)    
Mandatory relig. education    -2.544   
    (3.667)   
Religious taxes     1.763  
     (2.799)  
Government pays clergy      2.731 
      (2.063) 
Constant 37.43*** 39.57*** 38.71*** 39.82*** 39.67*** 39.55*** 
 (2.198) (1.706) (1.753) (1.690) (1.707) (1.690) 
Observations 86 86 86 86 86 86 
R-squared 0.699 0.692 0.702 0.690 0.690 0.695 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 17: Impact of ties between state and religion (H4) – Islam majority religion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GDP per capita -0.177 -0.163 -0.169 -0.165 -0.243* -0.194 
 (0.118) (0.114) (0.134) (0.119) (0.136) (0.132) 
Government effectiveness -1.397 -1.913 -3.533 -1.956 -4.072 -3.473 
 (2.879) (2.711) (3.087) (2.845) (3.193) (3.116) 
Index religion and state -0.262***      
 (0.0757)      
Religious laws  -12.04***     
  (3.060)     
Discrimination minority relig.   -0.324*    
   (0.169)    
Mandatory relig. education    -10.29***   
    (3.013)   
Religious taxes     -5.159  
     (4.921)  
Government pays clergy      -5.934* 
      (3.282) 
Constant 44.81*** 42.56*** 37.34*** 39.60*** 35.04*** 36.51*** 
 (3.817) (3.045) (3.014) (2.768) (2.743) (2.842) 
Observations 35 35 35 35 35 35 
R-squared 0.488 0.527 0.365 0.484 0.315 0.358 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, we combine key indicators for the four hypotheses in a synthesis regression (Tables 
18). This comprehensive estimation stresses the robustness of the H2 support: As shown be-
fore (Tables 7-9), Christian countries have larger shadow economies compared to countries 
where Islam or other religions dominate. Again, this finding for the total country sample is 
largely driven by the strength of the link for middle and low income sub-sample. The H4 re-
lated index for the proximity between religion and state misses significance in our compre-
hensive regression. Statistically, this is a consequence of a significant correlation between this 
index and the religion dummy: Islamic (Christian) countries have more (less) often close ties 
between the religious and the secular authorities.9 Therefore, we explore the link between 
both religious indicators through an interaction as well (Table 19). Indeed, the interactions 
between the religion dummies and the index on religion and state are significant, a finding 
which establishes the interplay of H2 and H4. The proximity between religion and state mat-
ters and tends to reduce the size of the shadow economy in middle and low income countries. 
However, this rather holds for the Islam and other non-Christian religions. These details also 
help to understand the puzzle that Islam in spite of its comparatively lenient tax ethics is asso-
ciated with smaller shadow economies. Our results point out that it is rather the closeness be-
tween the Islam and the secular government which is responsible than the ethical teaching of 
Islam as such. Typically, secular and religious authorities have closer ties in Islamic countries 
and this proximity has a stronger effect on the shadow economy compared to Christian coun-
tries. 
                                                 
9 The correlation coefficients are +0.53 for the Islam dummy and the aggregate index on religion and state. The 
correlation is -0.43 for the Christianity dummy and the index. 
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Table 18: Synthesis regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Total High income Middle/low income 
GDP per capita -0.281** -0.133 -1.053* 
 (0.108) (0.138) (0.539) 
Government effectiveness -6.918*** -6.828** -3.159 
 (1.583) (2.547) (2.583) 
Religiosity Index (H1)  0.0437 0.0383 -0.0528 
(Gallup) (0.0541) (0.0672) (0.0825) 
Islam (H2) -5.455** -5.971 -6.323** 
 (2.507) (7.836) (3.080) 
Other (H2) -5.234** -1.774 -8.138** 
 (2.280) (2.874) (3.172) 
Population share majority religion (H3) 0.0333 0.0364 0.0150 
 (0.0409) (0.0455) (0.0622) 
Index religion and state (H4) -0.0836 -0.0246 -0.106 
 (0.0625) (0.103) (0.0850) 
Constant 36.38*** 29.72*** 50.93*** 
 (4.426) (4.341) (8.497) 
Observations 122 40 81 
R-squared 0.611 0.582 0.266 
Reference case majority religion dummies: Christian, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 19: Synthesis regression including interaction H2/H4 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Total High income Middle/low income 
GDP per capita -0.243** -0.198 -0.937* 
 (0.106) (0.143) (0.539) 
Government effectiveness -6.623*** -6.327** -2.641 
 (1.538) (2.542) (2.503) 
Religiosity Index (H1)  0.0814 0.0236 -0.00519 
(Gallup) (0.0540) (0.0689) (0.0846) 
Islam (H2) 4.433 16.71 3.849 
 (4.264) (15.88) (5.413) 
Other (H2) 0.595 -2.705 0.945 
 (3.805) (4.614) (5.373) 
Population share majority religion (H3) 0.00630 0.0499 -0.00435 
 (0.0407) (0.0478) (0.0605) 
Index religion and state (H4) 0.170 -0.0165 0.204 
 (0.103) (0.124) (0.142) 
Islam x index religion and state -0.394*** -0.364 -0.436** 
 (0.132) (0.234) (0.179) 
Other x index religion and state -0.329** 0.0643 -0.473** 
 (0.166) (0.205) (0.226) 
Constant 30.84*** 30.24*** 42.92*** 
 (4.670) (4.540) (9.081) 
Observations 122 40 81 
R-squared 0.641 0.617 0.335 
Reference case majority religion dummies: Christian, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.4. Further robustness checks 
The preceding testing has supported two of the four presented hypotheses: There are actually 
significant differences in the size of the shadow economy, which correspond to dominant reli-
gions (H2); and the links between the religion and the state matter with the expected sign - 
closer links are apparently helpful to constrain informal transactions (H4). 
Critical reflections are necessary for cross-country results like these. Reversed causation is-
sues are less of a concern for religious indicators because a country’s religious characteristics 
date back long in history and in most cases far before the development of the modern fiscal 
state. For example, we can exclude that the size of the shadow economy has an impact on a 
country’s dominant religion. A similar confidence is justified for the proximity between reli-
gion and the state, which is also deeply rooted in a country’s history. A more serious threat, 
however, is that results are just an accidental outcome of a particular specification and do not 
survive slight variations of the estimation specification or the coverage of observations. 
Therefore, we report and present robustness checks with respect to our essential findings. We 
include some of the central total sample regressions: With respect to H2, we thus subject the 
results of the broad country classification for majority religion dummies and the population 
share specification (Tables 8 and 9) to a robustness test. Furthermore, with respect to H4, the 
results for the overall RAS indicator and the significant sub-indicators (Table 13) are subject 
to a robustness test as well. 
For a first robustness check, we deal with the problem of outliers and thus the robustness with 
respect to the inclusion or weighting of observations (Table 20). We apply the M-estimator, 
which downweights the influence of outliers. The negative impact of Islam remains signifi-
cant (5 per cent) both for the dummy and the population share. The results for the indicators 
on religion and state, both for the aggregate and the sub-indicators, remain the same with re-
spect to significance levels and magnitudes. 
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Table 20: Robustness checks – outliers 
 (1) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
GDP per capita -0.323*** -0.242*** -0.236*** -0.241*** -0.212** -0.229*** 
 (0.107) (0.086) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.0853) 
Government effectiveness -6.154*** -6.898*** -6.423*** -6.511*** -6.792*** -6.574*** 
 (1.333) (1.143) (1.088) (1.088) (1.096) (1.102) 
Share Islam -0.052**      
 (0.021)      
Share other religion -0.045      
 (0.028)      
Share no religion -0.085      
 (0.060)      
Islam  -3.618**     
  (1.666)     
Other religion  -3.368*     
  (1.772)     
Index religion and state   -0.0981**    
   (0.0391)    
Religious laws    -3.935**   
    (1.633)   
Discrimination minority relig.     -0.303***  
     (0.0917)  
Mandatory relig. education      -3.824** 
      (1.736) 
Constant 38.89*** 37.49*** 38.03*** 36.75*** 36.96*** 36.43*** 
 (1.530) (1.215) (1.318) (1.080) (1.108) (1.077) 
Observations 133 148 148 148 148 148 
R-squared 0.596 0.585 0.584 0.591 0.591 0.587 
M-estimation using Huber and Tukey biweights, standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Subsequently (Table 21), we test for the robustness of our findings against variations of the 
baseline specification. For that purpose, we augment the baseline controls (GDP per capita 
and government effectiveness) by the five further possible control variables (size of govern-
ment, unemployment rate, business freedom, fiscal freedom and freedom from corruption) 
and combine the religious indicator under scrutiny with all possible permutations of these 
core regression variables. The share of significant cases then gives an indication of the relia-
bility of the significance. It turns out that significances are no accidental outcome of a particu-
lar specification of the economic drivers of the shadow economy. The shares of significant 
coefficients for the religious indicators lay in the range between 80 and 100 percent. The 
overall religion and state indicator reaches a share of 95 percent of significant results for all 
permutations of economic controls. 
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Table 21: Robustness checks – baseline variations 
 Max Min Mean Significant 
cases 
>0 <0 Avg. 
t-statistic 
Obs. 
 H2: majority religion dummies 
Islam 0.54 -7.66 -5.18 81% 2% 98% 2.63 128 
Other -0.60 -6.62 -5.57 91% 0% 100% 2.60 128 
 H2: population shares religions 
Islam 0.00 -0.09 -0.07 88% 2% 98% 2.78 128 
Other -0.01 -0.09 -0.07 84% 0% 100% 2.08 128 
None -0.13 -0.40 -0.28 100% 0% 100% 3.06 128 
 H4: Index religion and state 
Index -0.07 -0.18 -0.13 95% 0% 100% 2.65 128 
 H4: religious education 
Dummy -2.12 -7.31 -5.02 76% 0% 100% 2.29 128 
 H4: discrimination of minority religions 
Dummy -0.15 -0.48 -0.33 94% 0% 100% 2.78 128 
 H4: religious laws 
Dummy -2.71 -7.25 -5.36 87% 0% 100% 2.55 128 
“Significant cases” reports the share where coefficients in questions have at least 10% significance; 128 regressions achieved 
through all combinations of the baseline variables: GDP per capita, government effectiveness, size of government, unem-
ployment rate, business freedom, fiscal freedom and freedom from corruption. 
 
Finally, we perform a test with respect to a possible non-standard distribution of error terms: 
Robust Huber-White standard errors (Table 22) leave our findings unaffected. Clustering the 
error terms at the level of the fine religious country classification strongly reconfirms the sig-
nificant differences across religions (Table 23). The significance level for the RAS indicators 
drop with the clustering, but the RAS overall indicator and the discrimination dummy remain 
significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 22: Robustness checks – non-standard error terms 
 (1) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita -0.316** -0.251*** -0.238*** -0.235*** -0.227** -0.222** 
 (0.138) (0.0845) (0.0845) (0.0847) (0.0890) (0.0855) 
Government effectiveness -6.148*** -7.127*** -6.658*** -6.732*** -6.840*** -6.806*** 
 (1.481) (1.043) (0.968) (0.975) (1.027) (0.974) 
Share Islam -0.0651***      
 (0.0240)      
Share other religion -0.0636*      
 (0.0373)      
Share no religion -0.165**      
 (0.0824)      
Islam  -5.123***     
  (1.878)     
Other religion  -5.320**     
  (2.143)     
Index religion and state   -0.110**    
   (0.0455)    
Religious laws    -4.527**   
    (1.922)   
Discrimination minority relig.     -0.264**  
     (0.127)  
Mandatory relig. education      -4.512** 
      (2.178) 
Constant 40.24*** 38.72*** 38.89*** 37.21*** 37.57*** 36.97*** 
 (1.898) (1.309) (1.370) (1.272) (1.193) (1.246) 
Observations 133 148 148 148 148 148 
R-squared 0.564 0.559 0.541 0.540 0.542 0.538 
Huber-White standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 23: Robustness checks – clustered errors 
 (1) (1) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
GDP per capita -0.316** -0.251*** -0.238** -0.235** -0.227** -0.222** 
 (0.0916) (0.0494) (0.0723) (0.0737) (0.0673) (0.0636) 
Government effectiveness -6.148*** -7.127*** -6.658*** -6.732*** -6.840*** -6.806*** 
 (0.785) (0.411) (0.508) (0.488) (0.329) (0.629) 
Share Islam -0.0651***      
 (0.0132)      
Share other religion -0.0636**      
 (0.0173)      
Share no religion -0.165**      
 (0.0490)      
Islam  -5.123***     
  (1.031)     
Other religion  -5.320***     
  (1.212)     
Index religion and state   -0.110*    
   (0.0469)    
Religious laws    -4.527   
    (2.628)   
Discrimination minority relig.     -0.264*  
     (0.129)  
Mandatory relig. education      -4.512 
      (3.297) 
Constant 40.24*** 38.72*** 38.89*** 37.21*** 37.57*** 36.97*** 
 (1.457) (1.182) (1.275) (1.434) (1.394) (1.476) 
       
Observations 133 148 148 148 148 148 
R-squared 0.564 0.559 0.541 0.540 0.542 0.538 
Clustering of standard errors at the country group level at fine religious classification (see Table 2), 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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4. Conclusions 
The latest research on the shadow economy and its interaction with the official economy (Feld 
and Schneider, 2010) shows that the shadow economy is not only influenced by “hard” fac-
tors such as tax pressure or regulation intensity. In addition, soft factors like tax moral play a 
role. Given that religions are important suppliers of ethical norms, the analysis of religion’s 
possible impact on the shadow economy promises a better understanding of international var-
iance.  
Overall, our findings support the view that religion influences the level of informal transac-
tions, albeit with several qualifications. It does not seem to be the case that the degree of indi-
vidual general religiosity is crucial. The analysis did not support the view that countries with 
religious citizens have smaller shadow economies per se. However, there is significant diver-
gence across main religions: Countries dominated by Islam or Eastern religions are associated 
with smaller shadow economies compared to Christian countries for comparable levels of 
economic development and government effectiveness. Furthermore, the proximity between 
state and religion is relevant whereas the degree of religious competition has no robust im-
pact. Close ties between the dominant religion and the state, e.g. through legislation based on 
religious doctrines, are typical for countries with a lower share of economic activity in the 
informal sector. This is in line with the view that religion uses its normative influence as a 
“supernatural police” to protect state interests if there is a reciprocal relationship between re-
ligion and state. The relatively low shares of the shadow economy for Islamic countries is 
remarkable, given that Islamic ethics appear to be relatively skeptical on several forms of 
modern taxation. Obviously, the particularly close ties between religion and state in Islamic 
countries compensate for this. Largely, these significant findings only hold for countries with 
low or middle income so that the existence of a state religion in industrial countries is of no 
empirical relevance. 
Of course, there are limitations to our analysis. Religion can be seen as a proxy for the cultur-
al imprint of a country so that other dimensions of culture may stand behind the diagnosed 
impact of religion. Furthermore, it would be worthwhile to study the dynamics of the link. 
Unfortunately, the lack of time series for key religious variables for a large country would 
only allow such a study for a much smaller country sample. 
Still, our findings already enrich the debate on the link between religion and economic devel-
opment. Mobilizing sufficient resources for public infrastructure is one of the key challenges 
for developing countries. Our findings suggest that religions can be a partner for the secular 
government to achieve the normative backing for and acceptance of taxation. At least in this 
respect, a strong role for religion is no obstacle for economic development. 
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Appendix 
Table A-1: Data definitions and sources 
Variable Details Reference 
year 
Source 
Dependent variable and baseline controls 
Size of the shadow economy  In % GDP, see section 3.1 2000 Schneider, 
Buehn and Mon-
tenegro (2010) 
GDP per capita in 1.000 Based on purchasing power pari-
ties, data are in constant 2005 
dollars 
2000 World Bank, 
International 
Comparison 
Database 
Government effectiveness Perception based index from -2.5 
to +2.5 
2000 World Bank, see: 
Schneider, 
Buehn and Mon-
tenegro (2010) 
Size of government General government final con-
sumption expenditure in % of GDP 
2000 United Nations, 
World Bank, see: 
Schneider, 
Buehn and Mon-
tenegro (2010) 
Unemployment rate % of total labor force 2000 International 
Labor Organiza-
tion, World 
Bank, national 
sources, see: 
Schneider, 
Buehn and Mon-
tenegro (2010) 
Business freedom Subcomponent of Economic Free-
dom Index from 0 (least business 
freedom) to 100 (maximum degree 
of freedom) 
2000 Heritage Foun-
dation 
Fiscal freedom Subcomponent of Economic Free-
dom Index from 0 (least fiscal 
freedom) to 100 (maximum degree 
of freedom) 
2000 Heritage Foun-
dation 
Freedom from corruption Subcomponent of Economic Free-
dom Index from 0 (highest corrup-
tion) to 100 (no corruption) 
2000 Heritage Foun-
dation 
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General religiosity 
Religion important (population 
share), Gallup 
Population share in % for which 
“religion important part of daily 
life” 
2010 Gallup World 
Poll Website 
Attending weekly (population 
share), Gallup 
Population share in % “attended a 
place of worship or religious ser-
vice within the last seven days” 
2010 Gallup World 
Poll Website 
Confidence in religious organization 
(population share), Gallup 
Population share in %  “having 
confidence in religious organiza-
tions (churches, mosques, temples, 
etc.)” 
2010 Gallup World 
Poll Website 
Gallup religiosity indicator Average of preceding three Gallup 
shares 
2010 Gallup World 
Poll Website 
Attending monthly (population 
share), WVS/ISSP 
Attending religious services once a 
month in % 
1995-
2000, 
mostly 
2000 
Dataset Fox and 
Tabory (2008), 
originating from 
WVS/ISSP  
Attending weekly (population 
share), WVS/ISSP 
Attending religious services once a 
week in % 
1995-
2000, 
mostly 
2000 
Dataset Fox and 
Tabory (2008), 
originating from 
WVS/ISSP 
Considering oneself religious (popu-
lation share), WVS/ISSP 
Self-assessment to be a “religious 
person” “independently of whether 
you go to church or not” in % 
1995-
2000, 
mostly 
2000 
Dataset Fox and 
Tabory (2008), 
originating from 
WVS/ISSP 
Specific religions 
Majority religion dummies see Table 1 around 
2000 
RAS project, 
Fox (2004) 
Different religions’ population 
shares 
RAS population %-shares (dctotal, 
ditotal, dototal, dnonetotal), con-
versions of missings into 0, if 
available shares add up to at least 
98%  
around 
2000 
calculated on the 
basis of data 
from RAS pro-
ject, Fox (2004) 
Religious fragmentation and competition 
Population share majority religion Shares in % relate to majority 
religion as classified by majority 
religion dummies  
around 
2000 
RAS project, 
Fox (2004) 
Herfindahl index religions’ popula-
tion shares 
Herfindahl calculation, index 
bound between 0 and 1  
around 
2000 
Dataset Fox and 
Tabory (2008) 
Dummy established state religion One or more established religions, 2000 RAS project, 
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based on RAS variable sch2000 Fox (2004) 
Closeness religion and state 
Composite indicator on closeness 
between religion and state 
RAS variable all2000, indicator 
between 0 (strong separation) and 
100 (fully religious state) 
2000 RAS project, 
Fox (2004) 
Dummy religious laws influence 
legislation 
Legislation either “substantially 
religious” or religious law is state 
law, based on RAS variable 
l1g2000 
2000 RAS project, 
Fox (2004) 
Indicator discrimination against 
minority religions 
RAS variable m2000, indicator 
between 0 (no discrimination) and 
48 (discrimination along all dimen-
sions) 
2000 RAS project, 
Fox (2004) 
Dummy mandatory religious educa-
tion 
RAS variable lej2000 2000 RAS project, 
Fox (2004) 
Dummy government collects taxes 
on behalf of religious organizations 
RAS variable lfn2000 2000 RAS project, 
Fox (2004) 
Dummy government funding of 
clergy 
RAS variable lgn2000 2000 RAS project, 
Fox (2004) 
WVS: World Value Survey, ISSP: International Social Survey Program, RAS: Religion and State 
 
Table A-2: Summary statistics baseline 
Variable  Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Min Max 
Size of the shadow economy in % GDP 161 33.75 13.04 8.60 67.30 
GDP per capita in 1.000 USD 154 11.27 12.82 0.26 62.16 
Government effectiveness 155 0.07 0.99 -1.89 2.26 
Size of government in % GDP 155 15.86 7.81 3.33 75.40 
Unemployment rate in % labor force 163 8.92 6.19 0.00 32.44 
Business freedom 154 64.25 13.31 40.00 100.00 
Fiscal freedom 154 68.32 15.18 30.50 99.90 
Freedom from corruption 154 40.24 25.03 10.00 100.00 
 
 
 
